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SECURITIES LAW-DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 14(e) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934: CHRIS-CRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC. V. PIPER
AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
In early 1969, Chris-Craft Industries (CCI), a Delaware corpora-
tion that manufactures recreational products, began an acquisition
program designed to obtain control of Piper Aircraft Corporation
(Piper), a manufacturer of light aircraft.1 Through several cash pur-
chases and a cash tender offer,2 CCI acquired 33 percent of the out-
standing Piper stock and then, through registered exchange offers,
attempted to obtain the additional 17 percent necessary for control.
By August 4, 1969, two such exchange offers had increased CCI's
holdings to 41 percent of the Piper stock.
To oppose the takeover attempt, the Piper family entered into a
defensive arrangement with Bangor Punta Corporation (BPC). 3 On
May 8, 1969, BPC and Piper agreed that BPC would make a "limited
exchange offer"4 of BPC debentures, stocks and warrants for the Piper
1. The facts of this case are recounted at length in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. Neither the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (1970),
nor the rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to
the '34 Act attempt to define a tender offer. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 69-70 (1973). A tender offer has been generally de-
fined, however, as "[a] public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a
group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class
or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon speci-
fied terms for cash and/or securities." Id. at 70. A tender offer in which securities of
the offeror are exchanged for securities of the offeree is also known as an exchange
offer and usually is subject to the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77 et seq. (1970).
3. There are various defensive tactics available to corporations that are the target
of takeover attempts through tender offers. Among them is the purchase of the target's
securities by a friendly third party. This occurred in Chris-Craft when BPO purchased
a substantial portion of the outstanding Piper stock from the Piper family. Other
available tactics are: (1) repurchases of its own shares by the target; (2) concen-
trated selling of the offeror's shares by friendly third parties; (3) dividend increases;
(4) stock splits; (5) issuance of additional shares; (6) creation of product line in-
compatibility between the target and the offeror; (7) defensive mergers; (8) discrimi-
natory voting provisions; (9) triggering of state takeover statutes; (10) legal action;
(11) publicity; and (12) restrictive loan agreements. For a full discussion of defensive
tactics, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 234-76.
4. A limited exchange offer is an offer made to a limited group of shareholders to
exchange the securities of one corporation for those of another. In this case the group
was limited to the Piper family. A limited exchange offer is not subject to the Williams
Act provisions if made so far in advance of the general tender offer that the limited
offer is not integrated with the general offer; The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(d) to
78n(d)-(f)(1970), is discussed in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRITIEs REGULA-
TION 676-78 (3d ed. 1972).
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family holdings of Piper stock. (BPC at that time valued its securities
at not less than $70 to $72 per share.) BPC also pledged to exert its
best efforts to acquire more than 50 percent of the outstanding Piper
stock. If BPC were successful in this effort, under the agreement it
would pay the Piper family the difference (if any) between the price
stated in the tender offers to the general public ($80) and the value-
at the time BPC's exchange offer opened-of the BPC stock that the
family had already received in the limited exchange offer. The lim-
ited exchange offer resulted in BPC's acquisition of 31 percent of the
outstanding Piper stock in exchange for some of its own securities and
its pledge to make a good faith effort to defeat CCI's takeover attempt
by obtaining more than 50 percent of the Piper stock. BPC and Piper
announced these arrangements in a joint press release on May 8. BPC
also announced then that it would make a public exchange offer of
BPC securities for Piper stock in order to acquire the additional Piper
securities necessary to gain control of Piper.
While awaiting approval of the public exchange offer by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC), BPC bought 120,000 shares
of Piper stock in private transactions. These purchases flagrantly dis-
regarded the SEC's proposed rule lOb-13 and existing SEC interpreta-
tions of rule lOb-6, which specifically prohibited "buying alongside."'
Through its public exchange offer, BPC acquired an additional 112,000
shares. On July 29, the expiration date of the last exchange offer,
BPC owned 45 percent and CCI 41 percent of the Piper shares. Each
company made several additional purchases through September 5,
1969, when BPC acquired 51 percent of the outstanding Piper shares
and became the majority and controlling stockholder.
On May 22, CCI filed suit against BPC and Piper in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
complaint alleged violations of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19346 (the '34 Act) and SEC rules l0b-57 and lOb-6,8 promul-
5. For an explanation of rule 10b-13 and the SEC interpretation of rule lOb-6,
see note 10 infra.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970) [hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, all references to
section 14(e) are to the provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 22,725 (1976)
[hereinafter, unless othenvise noted, all references to rule 10b-5 are to the rule promul.
gated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]. See generally 1-3
A. BROmBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD, SEC RULE lOb-5 (1975).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1976), 2 CCH Fan. Sa. L. REP. 22,726 (1976)
[hereinafter, unless othervise noted, all references to rule lOb-6 are to the rule promul-
gated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].
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gated under section 10(b) 9 of the Act, and sought damages and equita-
ble 'relief.'0 On an expedited appeal from the denial of a preliminary
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, all references
to section 10(b) are to the provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].
10. Chrii-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). Chris-Craft charged first that by deceptive omissions of material facts from its
tender offer materials, in violation of section 14(e) and rule 10b-5, BPC had caused it
to lose the opportunity to control Piper. (Section 14(e) of the '34 Act prohibits any
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in making or opposing a tender offer,
and reaches exchange offers as well as cash tender offers. Rule 10b-5 prohibits any
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.) Specifically, CCI alleged that BPC had not accurately represented
its financial status in forms required to be filed with the SEC prior to a tender offer.
BPC did not report that an asset (the Bangor and Aroostook Railroad) valued on its
books at $18.5 million actually was worth only $5 million. CCI argued that Piper
shareholders were deceived as to the value of the BPC securities received in exchange
for their Piper shares because they did not have this information when they tendered
their shares for BPC stock. The basis of this argument is that the market value of the
securities of a corporation reflects the securities market's perception of the value of the
corporation's underlying operating assets and its expectations as to the profitability of
the corporation's product lines. See generally W. HUSBAND & J. DocxERAY, MODERN
CORPORATION FINANCE 200-25 (5th ed. 1962). In essence, CCI was arguing that Piper
shareholders were led to believe that BPC stock was worth substantially more than a
proper accounting entry for the assets would have revealed. As a result of this decep-
tion, the argument continued, Piper shareholders could not have made an informed
decision.
Second, Chris-Craft alleged that by purchasing Piper stock in private transactions
outside the public exchange offer after the offer had begun, BPC had violated rule
lOb-6, which prohibits the purchase by an issuer of its own securities during a distri-
bution. A distribution of securities is an offer or sale to the public of a large portion
(usually ten percent or more) of the outstanding securities of a corporation in a manner
requiring registration under the Securities Act of 1933.
Rule 10b-6 explicitly forbids an issuer of securities to purchase any of its securities
that are the subject of a distribution in which it is a participant. The SEC staff has
interpreted rule 10b-6 as prohibiting purchases of target shares during an exchange
offer, "[t]he theory . . . [being] that, since the target shares were exchangeable for the
shares being distributed, they constituted either a right to receive the shares being dis-
tributed or ... a security entitling the holder to acquire the security being distributed."
Volk, Applicability of Rules 10b-6, 10b-4 and 10b-13 to Certain Market Activities in
Connection with Tender Offers and Exchange Offers and Other Business Combinations
in THE 10B SERiEs OF RULES 335, 340 (H. Erberg ed. 1975). See also 3 L. Loss,
SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 1599 (2d ed. 1961). In this case, CCI argued that the ex-
change offer had begun when BPC announced in a press release that such an offer
would be made in the near future and gave details of the offer. Since, by the terms of
the exchange offer, ownership of Piper shares entitled the holder to acquire BPO se-
curities, the purchase by BPC of Piper stock during the period of the exchange offer
was arguably the purchase of a security convertible into BPC stock and was therefore
within the SEC's interpretation of rule lOb-6.
This interpretation was later codified as rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13
(1976), 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 22,733 (1976), which prohibits any person making
a tender offer from purchasing, or arranging to purchase, the target security outside
the tender offer from the time the tender offer is announced until the termination of
the period of the offer.
The function of the SEC's interpretation of rule 10b-6 (and now of rule 10b-13)
is to prevent the offeror's manipulation of the market to his own advantage. For ex-
1976-77]
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injunction, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
BPC had violated rule lOb-6 by purchasing the 120,000 shares of Piper
stock in private transactions after an offer of exchange. 1
On remand, the district court dismissed the case for lack of causa-
tion and scienter with regard to the section 14(e) claim that BPC
had deceived the Piper shareholders by not disclosing the actual value
of a book asset, and for lack of a sufficient showing of injury as to the
rule lOb-6 claim. 2 On the appeal from this second district court de-
cision, the Second Circuit again reversed on all issues and found all
defendants jointly and severally liable for the rule lOb-6, section 14(e)
and rule lOb-5 violations.'13 The court found BPC's failure to disclose
the actual value ($5 million) of a company asset that had been carried
on BPC's books at a value of $18.5 million to be a material omission
of fact' 4 and, thus, a violation of section 14(e).' 5 The court held that
"[t]he measure of damages should be the reduction in the appraisal
value of CCI's Piper holdings attributable to BPC's taking a majority
position and reducing CCI to a minority position, and thus being able
to compel a merger at any time.'"
On remand, the district court estimated the appraisal value'
7 of
each Piper share to be $48 after discounting the increase in market
ample, CCI argued that the large purchases by BPC "had a tendency to boost the
market value of the Piper stock to an artificially high level." Since BPC had already
announced that it would make an exchange offer, "reasonable investors were likely to
have attributed the increase in the price of Piper stock to the soundness of BPC's ex-
change offer. As a result, the operation of the market would tend to raise the market
price of the BPC package to align it with the inflated Piper price." Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 377 (2d Cir. 1973).
11. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970)
(en bane) thereinafter cited as Chris-Craft I].
12. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
13. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 355-80 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910, 924 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Chris-Craft II].
14. 480 F.2d at 355-80.
15. Under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the plaintiff need prove only the materiality of
the omission, not his personal reliance on it. Id. at 152-54. The test of materiality is
whether a reasonable investor might have considered the omitted fact in making a de-
cision to purchase or sell. Id. at 154.
16. Chris-Craft II, 480 F.2d at 380.
17. The appraisal value of stock is the fair cash value of the stock as determined
by independent experts, in the light of market value (if any), net asset value, dividends,
earnings, prospects, and the nature of the enterprise. See H. HENN, LAW oF CoRPoRA-
TioNs 726-27 (2d ed. 1970). The circumstances under which shareholders may exercise
their appraisal rights are provided for by state corporation law and usually involve or-
ganic changes in the corporation. Id. For further discussion of appraisal, see text ac-
companying notes 57-71 infra.
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value attributable to the tender offer contest.' 8 Since the court of ap-
peals had found CCI's injury to be the loss of the opportunity to gain
control of Piper, the district court then calculated the value of the con-
trol premium for CCI's Piper holdings.' 9 It set the value of the control
premium at $2.40 per share, five percent above the derived value
($48). Thus, the damages awarded were the difference in appraisal
value between what CCI's Piper holdings would have been worth as
a controlling interest ($50.40 per share), and the stock's current value
as a minority block ($48 per share), 20 for a total of nearly $1.7 million
in damages. In addition, the district court allowed prejudgment in-
terest on the damage recovery.
On the third appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's determination of damages, holding that the correct measure
was the difference between the average price CCI paid for its Piper
shares (about $64 each) and the value of the shares at a hypothetical
public offering after BPC attained the majority position.2' On the
basis of testimony by CCI's expert witness, the court found that this
latter figure was $27.22 Thus, the damages awarded were $37 per share,
or- over $25 million in all, plus approximately $10 million in pre-
judgment interest. The court, however, affirmed the equitable relief
granted by the district court.28
This Note analyzes the Second Circuit's damage award in rela-
tion to traditional theories of damages and examines both the practical
implications and the theory of the award. Although the awards of
18. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Pipet Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
19. A control premium represents the percentage increase in the value of a se-
curity as part of a block-owing to the desirability of the block as a unit for its voting
and other powers-over the market value of the security in small lots.
20. 384 F. Supp. at 523.
21. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 185, 190 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Chris-Craft 11].
22. 516 F.2d at 189-90.
23. 516 F.2d at 193. The district court order can be summarized as follows: (1)
BPC was enjoined from voting the 230,000 illegally acquired shares (sterilization). (2)
These sterilized shares would be considered authorized and outstanding, but they could
not be counted for the purpose of determining a quorum at stockholders' meetings. (3)
All changes made in Piper's bylaws since September 4, 1969 (largely at BPC's urging)
were rescinded; all bylaws and the Piper corporate charter would remain as they were
prior to September 4, unless alterations were agreed to by both BPC and CCI or
ordered by the court. (4) No increase or decrease in Piper's outstanding voting securities
would be permitted; no merger, dissolution or liquidation of Piper could take place
without court approval. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F.
Supp. 507, 523-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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both the district court and the court of appeals are cast in the out-of-
pocket mold, each court utilized different figures in the out-of-pocket
equation. The Note concludes that the district court incorrectly used
the state-law appraisal method to value Chris-Craft's Piper holdings
and to compute the amount of damages which could be recovered.
The damage award of the Second Circuit was largely correct-
the court applied a formula that has been consistently utilized to
compute out-of-pocket damages in securities fraud cases. Two con-
siderations, however, argue for a reduction in the amount of damages
awarded to CCI. First, a substantial portion of the award reflects the
decline in the market value of Piper shares, a decline which fell equally
upon CCI and BPC. To the extent that this decline was attributable
to termination of the tender offers, the resulting diminution in the
value of CCI's Piper holdings cannot be regarded as compensable under
section 28 of the '34 Act, which limits recovery to "actual damages on
account of the act complained of."'24 Second, the basic policy of the
securities laws-protection of the investor-is thwarted by the damage
award as it presently stands. Payment of the damages could severely
handicap BPC, ultimately harming those BPC shareholders who should
be protected under the statute. Therefore, this Note suggests a down-
ward adjustment of the award to reflect the natural decline in market
value of Piper shares following the close of the tender offers.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MEASURE OF
DAMAGES IN SEC FRAUD ACTIONS
The common law action for fraud provides three possible rem-
edies: rescission,25 damages for breach of warranty,2 6 and damages
for deceit.27 Each, however, has proved inadequate when imported
into securities fraud actions.28
A. Measures of Recovery for Securities Fraud at Common Law
The fraud provisions of the federal securities laws are derived
from the common law tort action of deceit,29 which requires proof of
24. 15 U.S.G. § 78bb(a) (1970).
25. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 231 (1933).
26. Id. at 228.
27. Id. at 233-42.
28. Id. at 227-42.
29. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss,
[Vol. 26
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five elements: (1) a false representation of fact, (2) made knowingly
or without a sufficient basis for the statement made by the defendant,
(3) with the intent to induce the plaintiff to act, and (4) upon which
the plaintiff relied, (5) to his tangible detriment (damage). 3° When
the common law notions of deceit were incorporated into the securities
laws, the proof requirement for several of these elements, most notably
scienter, was either modified or eliminated.31
1. Out-of-Pocket Damages. Damages in a common law deceit ac-
tion are governed by an out-of-pocket measure, that is, by the differ-
ence between the purchase price of the securities and their value at
the time of delivery.32
SfCURTImS REGULATION 3535-55 (Supp. 2d ed. 1969). For the common law deceit ac-
tion, see RESTATEMENT oF'TORTS §§ 525-52 (1934); W. PROSSER, THE LAW oF TORTS
685 (4th ed. 1971).
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 685-86.
31. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), requires
only that plaintiffs prove that a false representation or omission of a material fact has
been made in a registration statement. Plaintiff has the benefit of a presumption that
he relied on the representation, which can be rebutted by a showing that plaintiff knew
of the omission or misrepresentation. No intent to defraud need be shown. Damages
and limitations thereon are explicitly prescribed.
Section 12 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), gives purchasers of securities
the right to rescind a purchase following an illegal offer or sale in violation of section
5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), and in cases in which an untrue or misrepresented ma-
terial fact has been made in an oral or written statement. No scienter requirement
exists. As in the case of a section 11 violation, plaintiff has the benefit of a rebuttable
presumption of reliance.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lob-5 promulgated
thereunder forbid the use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," as well as
misrepresentations in the purchase or sale of any security. Until Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), judicial interpretations of this rule consistently had im-
posed liability without scienter. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301
(2d Cir. 1971); Chris-Craft II, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973). In Hochfelder, the
Supreme Court held that in a private action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
plaintiff must allege scienter, that is, the defendant's intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud. However, it is not clear from the decision whether a plaintiff must allege
a specific intent to deceive or, as some language in the decision suggests, whether an
allegation of knowledge and recklessness will be sufficient to survive a motion for a di-
rected verdict. The broad language in the decision suggests that the principle of the
case will not be limited to its facts-an accounting firm accused of aiding and abetting
a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by a corporation. Since the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Mills v. Electric-Autolite, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), clearly rejected the need to prove reliance under
rule lob-5 in cases involving allegations of material omissions, reliance must be proved
now only in cases of alleged misrepresentation. Damages for violation of rule lOb-5
generally are determined by the out-of-pocket method-the difference between what the
plaintiff, if a purchaser, paid for the securities and the "true" value of the securities
determined at some later date (resulting in either a return of the ill-gotten gains or
compensation for the loss incurred). R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcURITIEs REGULA-
TION 1186 (3d ed. 1972).
32. 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1629.
1976-77]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
1 2. Rescission. Rescission is both a defense to an action for breach
of contract and a remedy which may be sought in an action for resti-
tution.83 As a form of relief, rescission restores the buyer to his pre-
transaction financial position: the purchaser returns the securities to
the seller, in exchange for restitution of the purchase price. No show-
ing of causation of actual harm is required. Plaintiff need only show a
misrepresentation of a material fact upon which he relied.
3. Loss-of-the-Bargain Damages. A common law breach of war-
ranty action utilizes a loss-of-the-bargain calculation of damages.8 4 The
Uniform Commercial Code defines this measure of damages as "the
difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to
the buyer and the value they would have had if they had answered
the warranty."8 5
B. Measures of Recovery for Securities Fraud Under the Federal
Securities Laws
The measures of damages available to plaintiffs suing under the
federal securities laws essentially conform to those available for com-
mon law fraud, with variations developed to tailor damages to specific
cases.
1. Loss-of-the-Bargain Damages. The loss-of-the-bargain approach
generally is not recognized as an appropriate theory of damages under
rule lOb-5.86 In Smith v. Bolles,37 a decision antedating the securities
laws, the Supreme Court declared this approach unacceptable as a
remedy for deceit because of its inherently speculative nature. The
decision has been followed closely by the courts since the enactment
of the securities laws.38
2. Rescission. Section 1239 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the '33
33. Id. at 1631.
34. Id. at 1628.
35. UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 2-714(2).
36. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 381 (1974). But see Richardson v. MacArthur,
451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Gottieb v. Sandia American Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980
(E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied sub nom. Wechsler v. Gottlieb, 405 U.S. 938 (1971). For a general
description of rule lOb-5, see note 31 supra.
37. 132 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1889).
38. The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the loss-of-the-bargain approach in
Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
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Act) explicitly grants a right of rescission to any purchaser of secu-
rities whose purchase occurred pursuant to an illegal offer or a sale
prohibited by section 5,40 or pursuant to an untrue or misrepresented
material fact contained in an oral or written statement.41 To prevail,
plaintiff must prove only the materiality of the misstatement. Causa-
tion and scienter need not be shown.
Section 11(e) of the '33 Act 42 provides for "rescissory" damages
for any buyer who purchases securities pursuant to a materially de-
fective registration statement.43 These damages, a modification of com-
mon law rescission, are the "difference between the value that plaintiff
gave up and that which he received, calculated as of some time sub-
sequent to the transaction date."' '
3. Out-of-Pocket Damages. While sections 11 and 12 of the '33
Act provide explicit civil remedies, the anti-fraud sections of the '34
Act lack specific provisions for civil liability. As a result, the courts
have exercised greater flexibility in awarding damages for violations
of rule lOb-5 and section 9(a) (2). 45
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
41. Section 12 states in part:
Any person who-(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of
this title, or (2) offers or sells a security... by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact ...
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him . . . tfor] the
consideration paid for such security . . . upon the tender of such security,
or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
43. Section 11 (e) states in pertinent part:
The suit authorized under subsection (a) . . . may be to recover such dam-
ages as shall represent the difference between the amount paid for the se-
curity . . . and (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought,
or (2) the price at which such security shall have been disposed of in the
market before suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall have been
disposed of after suit but before judgment ....
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970). Liability under this section is limited by the defense of
"due diligence" allowed to defendants under section 11(b). 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
44. Note, supra note 36, at 372. "Rescissory" damages are awarded in lieu of re-
scission where the stock is no longer available, or where return of the stock would be
ineffective to make the plaintiff whole. See id. at 372-74. For a discussion of possible
problems with the calculation of damages according to this theory, see id.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2) (1970) [hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, all refer-
ences to section 9(a) (2) are to the provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].
Prior to 1968, rule 14a-9, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was
the only other anti-fraud provision of the '34 Act. (Rule 14a-9 prohibits false or mis-
leading statements of material facts in proxy statements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976),
2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 24,013 (1976).) With the passage of the Williams Act
1976-77]
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The most commonly utilized measure of damages for violations
of rule lOb-546 is the out-of-pocket measure, which attempts to quan-
tify plaintiff's lost profits. 47 Until Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,4
out-of-pocket damages were awarded only in situations where privity
existed between plaintiff and defendant.49 In Mitchell, there was no
privity between plaintiffs (sellers of stock on the open market) and
defendants (insiders-company officers and employees who withheld
information). Defendants made material misstatements in press re-
leases and traded on inside information in violation of rule lOb-5,
for which the Tenth Circuit awarded out-of-pocket damages equal to
the difference between the highest market price after the commission
of the fraud (up to the time the reasonable investor would have re-
entered the market) and the price plaintiffs received for their stock.50
Since Mitchell, however, courts have failed to adhere to any given
theory and have awarded damages according to general equitable
principles.51
It is against this background of the common law measures of dam-
ages, as altered by statutory mandate and judicial interpretation, that
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Chris-Craft III undertook to
decide for the first time the appropriate measure of damages for a sec-
tion 14(e) violation. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to the
amendments to the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(d) to 78n(d)-(f) (1970), section 14(c)
became a fourth fraud provision. Like its companion '34 Act provisions, it does not pro-
vide an explicit theory of damages. Chris-Craft is the first case involving a section
14(e) violation to require a damage assessment. (See note 87 infra for the legislative
history of the Williams Act.)
A fifth anti-fraud provision in the securities acts is section 17(a) of the '33 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). Although virtually identical to rule 10b-5 in its language,
it is limited to misrepresentations or omissions of material facts in the offer or sale of
securities and does not apply to fraud in the purchase of securities. No explicit measure
of damages is prescribed in the text of section 17(a). However, the out-of-pocket meas-
ure of damages generally would apply since all rule lOb-5 violations involving a fraud
in the offering of securities would be considered section 17 violations as well. R.
JENNINGS & H. MARsH, SECURITrES REGULATION 1074-75 (3d. ed. 1972). See especially
id. at 1075 n.22. Section 24 of the '33 Act provides criminal penalties for willful viola-
tion of section 17. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
46. See note 31 supra.
47. See note 31 supra for a definition of out-of-pocket damages.
48. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied sub
nom. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
.49. Note, supra note 36, at 373, 385. See also Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63
Nw. U. L. REv. 423, 427-28 (1968).
50. 446 F.2d at 105.
51. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35,43 (10th Cir. 1971).
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difference between the actual purchase price and the estimated value
of the Piper shares after Bangor Punta became the majority share-
holder 5 2 --an out-of-pocket measure of damages. 53 It is important to
note that the district court award also can be characterized as out-of-
pocket damages. The district court, however, achieved its result by
using basic figures different from those used by the Second Circuit.
Its' emphasis on the actual value of the shares received54 (measured
by appraisal based on hypothetical sales of 100-share blocks) differs
from the traditional out-of-pocket approach (based on purchase pricek5 )
utilized by the court of appeals.
II. THE REJECTION OF THE DIsTcT COURT'S AwARD
The district court's utilization of the appraisal approach to deter-
mine the actual value of CCI's Piper stock was an attempt on its part
52. Chris-Craft III, 516 F.2d at 190.
53. The award can most easily be understood as out-of-pocket rather than re-
scissory damages by comparing the purposes of these two measures of damages. The
object of rescissory damages is to restore the injured party to his pre-transaction finan-
cial position. Rescissory damages are calculated as the difference between the actual
purchase (or sale) price and the price which would have been paid (or received) but
for the fraud. As noted above, rescissory damages are utilized as a substitute for
rescission where the injury justifies rescission but intervening circumstances make the
actual return of the stock impossible or undesirable. In cases of this kind, rescissory
damages are awarded as the best alternative to a complete unwinding of the trans-
action. See note 44 supra.
The function of out-of-pocket damages is to restore lost profits. As such, this
remedy is inherently broader in purpose and more flexible in application than rescissory
damages. Out-of-pocket damages have been calculated variously as the difference be-
tween the purchase price and the price (1) at the time of delivery, (2) at the time
of the discovery of the fraud, or (3) at the time of the commencement of the court
action. See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05 (10th Cir. 1968); Estate Counseling
Service v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir.
1962). This flexibility in determining damages acknowledges the variety of circum-
stances that may surround a fraud and cause a loss of profits. This same flexibility ob-
tains under section 11 of the '33 Act for "rescissory" damages. Where rescissory dam-
ages are appropriate, however, the desire to limit recovery to an amount which will re-
store plaintiff to his pre-transaction position results in a more conservative award. For
example, section 11(b) allows mitigation of a rescissory award by a showing of due
diligence by defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
On the other hand, an out-of-pocket measure is commonly applied for violations
of rule lOb-5, a very broad regulation that requires an equally broad formula for
measuring damages. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
54. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 515-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
55. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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to comply with the mandate of the court of appeals in Chris-Craft 11.50
Traditionally, appraisal rights57 have been available to minority share-
holders who are dissatisfied with a substantial change in the corporate
structure and are being offered less than what they consider fair value
for their shares.6 8 Pennsylvania law, which governed the district court's
award of damages,59 assumes that there is no active market for the
stock.60 Where there is such a market, however, market value is a ma-
jor factor in determining the fair value of the minority sharehold-
er's stock."' Since the Piper shares were traded on an active mar-
ket, the district court clearly erred in using appraisal to calculate the
actual value of CCI's Piper stock. 2
The court of appeals pointed out that the appraisal approach
taken by the district court assumed that CCI's minority holdings had
a stable value.63 Such stability is the usual case in appraisal situations
where a minority shareholder is being squeezed out by the majority
in a corporate merger or consolidation" and the sole question is the
56. 480 F.2d at 380.
57. See note 17 supra.
58. Kaplan, Problems in the Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities, 34
B.U.L. R.v. 291 (1954); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes,
79 HARv. L. Rlv. 1453, 1457-60 (1966). See also Lattin, Minority and Dissenting
Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 307 (1958);
Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 MICH. L. Rav. 1165 (1940); Lattin,
Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. Ryv. 233
(1931).
59. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 512-14 and
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 1908 (Purdon 1967). Pennsyl-
vania law applied because the shares to be appraised were issued by a Pennsylvania
corporation, Piper. See Chris-Craft II, 480 F.2d at 350.
60. 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1515(L) (Purdon Supp. 1976). See also DnL.
CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (Supp. 1976).
61. See, e.g., Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd
mem. sub nom. Wesson v. Mississippi River Corp., 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973). In
that case, the court held that where there is an active market in a stock, "[t]hcory
must yield to the reality of the market place, 'the true appraiser.'" Id. at 370. See also
Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 922, 55 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270 App.
Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605, motion for leave to appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 998 (1st
Dep't 1946). In Jones the court held that market value is the best evidence for all
purposes where it fairly reflects the opinion of informed buyers and sellers.
62. This point is discussed in Note, Chris-Craft and the Loss of Opportunity to
Control: The Lost Opportunity, 43 FORDHAm L. R.v. 820, 831-34 (1975).
63. See Chris-Craft I1, 516 F.2d at 183:
Moreover, the court erroneously assumed that our phrase "appraisal value"
referred to a statutory appraisal proceeding. Such connotation, had we intended
it, would have justified the conclusion that there had been no reduction in the
value of CCI's Piper holdings upon BPC's gaining control.
64. A shareholder can be "squeezed out" of ownership by the majority by a re-
[Vol. 26
SECURITIES LAW DAMAGES
fair purchase price of the stock. The purpose of appraisal statutes is
to require the corporation to purchase the minority's shares at a fair
price 5 and to hold safe from loss those shareholders who disagree with
a bona fide corporate action.66 The public policy underlying the
appraisal statutes is that a minority member in a corporation whose
stock is not actively traded should be allowed to terminate his interest
in the corporation when he disagrees with a proposed fundamental
change in the corporate structure or status. The statutes recognize that
unlike shareholders in corporations whose securities have an active
market, minority shareholders in some situations have no recourse
other than to sell holdings to the majority or to the corporation. The
limited options facing this group of forced sellers particularly lend
themselves to harsh dealing by the majority.67 Consequently, appraisal
rights are designed to prevent purchase of the minority's shares at
an unreasonably low price. They represent a statutory protection foi
those who do not have the means to protect themselves from oppres-
sive, but otherwise lawful, corporate undertakings. Of course, where
verse stock split, for example, or by a high exchange ratio in a merger. In such situa-
tions, the controlling shareholders will have agreed that ownership of fractional shares
will not be permitted after the stock split. In order for a shareholder to maintain
approximately the same proportion of ownership in the company, he may have to pur-
chase some number of fractional shares, requiring a substantial investment of capital.
Faced with a choice between additional investment or a diminished interest the small
shareholder is naturally encouraged to sell his stock. W. CARy, CORPORATiONS 1229-33
(4th ed. abr. 1970); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1630
(1961).
Various state statutes allow minority shareholders to assert appraisal rights for
corporate changes other than a merger, including substantial alteration of the articles
of incorporation and sale of corporate assets. Other jurisdictions have embraced the
concept of the de facto merger to effectuate the objectives of the appraisal rights pro-
visions. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958); cf.
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 40 Del. Oh. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (1962). See also Man-
ning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy. An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J.
223, 262 (1962).
65. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1964).
66. Id. See also Manning, supra note 64, at 231.
67. Stockholders have looked to appraisal statutes, in recent years, to protect their
interests where public corporations have chosen to "go private." "Going private" essen-
tially involves a publicly held corporation's reduction of its outstanding shares in order
to escape the requirements of the '33 Act and the '34 Act. See generally Solomon,
Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals
for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 141 (1975). Many of the tactics utilized to "squeeze
out" minority shareholders discussed in note 64 supra are also used to effectuate a
return to privately held status. Thus, resort to appraisal rights may be appropriate. Id.
at 156-59.
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fraud is involved, shareholders have still other remedies available to
them. 6
The success or failure of the majority's disputed action may well
affect the value of the minority's shares. Thus, the statutory provisions
for appraisal rights contain time limitations designed to hold safe the
value of the minority's shares from any decrease in the value of the
corporation's stock caused by the majority's actions. 9
Chris-Craft was not a shareholder seeking protection from possi-
ble future harm: it had suffered injury from the reduction in the value
of its Piper holdings when BPC attained the majority position.70 Ap-
praisal is a determination of the fair value of plaintiff's stock for pur-
poses of terminating his interest in the corporation,71 not compen-
sation for injury sustained. Furthermore, the court found fraud to be
the cause of the injury, a fact which automatically made available other
remedies. Clearly, another approach was more appropriate.
The essential difference between Chris-Craft and most appraisal
cases is the adequacy of the remedy in relation to the injury, not the
change in the value of the holdings, the factor emphasized by the court
of appeals. Thus, although CCI's holdings could be appraised using
conventional methods,72 it is clear that such an endeavor would be
meaningless as an attempt to redress the type of injury suffered,79 both
because fraud was involved, 74 and because the purpose of protecting
the minority shareholder from loss was irrelevant once the harm had
occurred by the reduction in the value of CCI's Piper holdings. 7 5 The
critical factor is that CCI suffered an injury greater than loss of faith
in the corporate purpose (the "injury" sought to be redressed by the
appraisal statutes). 76 Damages measured by the difference in appraisal
value before and after BPC attained control, therefore, cannot be ade-
quate. In addition, appraisal value has never been utilized in com-
68. Kaplan, Problems in the Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities, 34
B.U.L. REv. 291 (1954).
69. Manning, supra note 64, at 231.
70. Chris-Craft II, 480 F.2d at 379.
71. Vorenberg, supra note 65, at 1189; Kaplan, supra note 68, at 291.
72. Note, Chris-Craft and Loss of Opportunity to Control: The Lost Opportunity,
43 FoRDHAb L. Rav. 820, 832 (1975). Despite much deviation, the courts generally
consider three factors in arriving at the value of a share: net asset and investment
value of the issuer, and market value of the shares. Id.
73. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
74. See note 68 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
76. See generally Manning, supra note 64.
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puting damages under any of the three theories discussed above.77
Each uses purchase price as its basic value. 7
Finally, the court of appeals properly rejected the district court's
use of 100-share round lots as a basis for evaluating the marketability
of CCI's holdings,79 since blockage and unmarketability made reliance
on such units unreasonable.8 0
In sum, the Second Circuit correctly rejected the appraisal method
of awarding damages, both because an active market existed for the
Piper stock and because the purpose of appraisal (the protection of
the minority shareholder from loss) could not be achieved. Even under
the traditional appraisal approach, the finding of fraud required an
alternative remedy.
III. THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
As indicated above,8 the court of appeals substituted an award
based upon the out-of-pocket theory, that is, the difference between
CCI's purchase price and the value of CCI's block of stock in a hypo-
thetical public offering at the time of the discovery of the fraud. Al-
though Chris-Craft is the first case involving damages under section
14(e), there is ample authority for the use of this measure of damages
in securities fraud cases, especially for rule lOb-5 violations.8 2 Dam-
77. See text accompanying notes 36-47 supra. The out-of-pocket method is essen-
tially the difference between the purchase price and the actual value at the time of
delivery. The loss-of-the-bargain rule uses, in effect, the difference between the pur-
chase price and the guaranteed value. The rescissory theory generally seeks the dif-
ference between the purchase price and the market value.
78. See, e.g., Afliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Swan-
son v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 1973); Mitchell
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
79. Chris-Craft II, 516 F.2d at 184.
80. Note, Chris-Craft and the Loss of Opportunity, supra note 62, at 834-39, con-
tains an excellent discussion of the myopia of the district court's decision. The block-
age concept recognizes that even if a corporation's stock is widely held and traded on
a national securities exchange, the marketability and value of a block of stock will de-
crease if the block to be marketed is significantly larger than the normal floating sup-
ply (the amount of stock available for trading at a given time). Id. at 836-37.
81. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
82. Courts generally apply the out-of-pocket rule in awarding damages in rule
10b-5 cases. See note 31 supra, See also Estate Counseling Selvice, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962); Cant v. Becker &
Co., 379 F. Supp. 972, 974 (1974). In Estate Counseling Service the court said:
That Act permits recovery of [plaintiff's] actual damages "on account of the
act complained of." "Actual damages," under the Federal rule of damages for
fraud is the "out-of-pocket rule." In the federal courts the measure of damages
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ages awarded under rule 10b-5, however, are not directly apposite.
Prior to passage of the Williams Act in 1968,83 a person who did not
meet the strict requirement that a plaintiff in a rule 1Ob-5 case be
either a purchaser or seller 4 and who did not fall within one of the
exceptions to that requirement, 5 was without remedy under the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws. 8 In order to remedy this prob-
lem,87 the Williams Act added subsection (e) to section 14 of the '34
Act, doing away with the purchase or sale requirement in tender
offers.88
The Act clearly contemplated suit by a defrauded offeror in a
tender offer situation 9 of the kind presented in Chris-Craft. However,
recoverable by one who through fraud or misrepresentation has been induced
to purchase bonds or corporate stock, is the difference between the contract
price, or the price paid, and the real or actual value at the date of sale, to-
gether with such outlays as are attributable to the defendant's conduct. Or,
in other words, the difference between the amount parted with and the value
of the thing received.
303 F.2d at 533. Many courts allow the determination of the actual value to be cal-
culated as of the date of the discovery of the fraud. E.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d
94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968).
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(d) to 78n(d)-(f) (1970) [hereinafter, unless otherwise noted,
all references to the Williams Act are to the 1968 amendments cited herein to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq.].
84. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, rehearing denied,
423 U.S. 884 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
85. See Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th
Cir.), -cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (shareholder held a "forced seller" after a
merger); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970) (shareholder held
a "forced seller" after a liquidation); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., Inc., 374 F.2d
627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (shareholder held a "forced seller"
after a short form merger); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967)
(contract to purchase without intent to complete the sale held a sale); Stockwell v,
Reynolds & Co., 352 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (a purchase or sale where plain-
tiff fraudulently induced to retain securities). See generally R. JENNINOS & H. MARSH,
SEcuRtrs REGULATION 1181-84 (3d ed. 1972). This trend toward erosion of the
"Birnbaum rule" has, of course, been halted by Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
86. See Laurenzano v. Einbender, 265 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); H.R. REP. No.
90-1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1967).
88. Section 14(e) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or prac-
tices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
offer, request or invitation.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
89. S. REP,. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1967).
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the general theory of damages developed in cases arising under rule
lOb-5 is strained if damages are awarded to a plaintiff who could not
have been misled by the deceptive omission of a material fact.90 Thus,
in examining the award ordered by the court of appeals, it is first neces-
sary to consider whether the damages awarded for the section 14(e)
violations (which did not mislead Chris-Craft) comport with the in-
tent of the Williams Act.
The avowed purpose of the Williams Act was to extend the dis-
closure provisions of the '34 Act to exchange offers and cash tender
offers and to provide greater flexibility for dealing with such innova-
tive corporate activities as tender offers and the purchase by an issuer
of its own securities.91 This intent to expand the protection of the
securities laws to new forms of securities transactions is consistent with
longstanding congressional attitudes. More than three decades earlier,
Congress had responded similarly to changes and innovations on the
securities exchanges and in corporate practices by enacting the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934.912
The out-of-pocket measure of damages is the one most commonly-
applied to rule lOb-5 violations.93 Absent specific statutory language or
congressional intent to the contrary, it is arguable that remedies sim-
ilar to those already utilized in enforcing the '34 Act should be ap-
plied to section 14(e) violations as well. Both sections 10(b) and
14(e) of the '34 Act prohibit fraudulent misrepresentations and omis-
sions of material facts. Since the violations are the same, the remedies
should be the same for both. Since the parent Act and the amendment
share a common purpose,94 and since the out-of-pocket remedy has been
consistently applied in federal securities fraud cases, 95 in the absence
of congressional intent to provide alternate remedies for enforcement
of the Williams Act, 96 the court of appeals could apply the ot-of-pocket
rule without deviating from the congressional design .97
90. In Chris-Craft, the sellers were Piper shareholders. Recovery by them under
rule 10b-5 would be justified since the material omitted by BPC could have affected
the decisions of the Piper shareholders to tender.
91. 6 L. Loss, SEcuRITIs REGULATION 3660-61 (Supp. 2d ed. 1969).
92. See HR. REP. No. 73-1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1934).
93. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
94. See notes 91-92 supra.
95. See note 31 supra.
96. See note 87 sup ra.
97. Application of the out-of-pocket rule to the rule 10b-6 violations is proper in
view of the rule's common parentage with rule 10b-5 in section 10(b) of the '34 Act
Both lOb-5 and 10b-6 have as their purpose the prohibition of "any manipulative or
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., The inquiry should not terminate here, however, for if this theo-
retically acceptable method contravenes any other provision of the
'34 Act relating to damages, it must be rejected. Section 28(a) of the
'34 Act explicitly limits a plaintiff's recovery for any violation of the
Act to "actual damages on account of the act complained of."' , The
Second Circuit in Chris-Craft II held that "[w]hat the securities law
violations caused was a denial to CCI of a fair opportunity to complete
for control of Piper. The specific injury sustained was a reduction in
the value of CCI's Piper holdings upon BPC's unfairly obtaining con-
trol."' 99 Thus, the "actual damages" to be quantified were the loss of
the opportunity fairly to compete for control of Piper.
The "actual damages" language in section 28(a) has been inter-
pteted in rule lOb-5 cases to mean application of the out-of-pocket
approach, 0  and has prohibited double recovery' and punitive0 2
and speculative'" damages. Damages awarded under the '34 Act are
deceptive device or contrivance." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). This broad language
permits the SEC (or a private litigant) great latitude in enforcing these anti-fraud
provisions. Similarly, the out-of-pocket rule, as the most flexible of the damage theories
utilized in cases of federal securities fraud (see note 53 supra), is the best 'parent"
for a damage remedy that accommodates the numerous variations in tie violations
of section 10(b).
Unfortunately, in cases in which plaintiffs have alleged violations of rule lOb-6
they have also alleged violations of rule lOb-5 or of section 9(a) (2) of the '34 Act.
As a result, the justification for damage awards in these cases is phrased in terms of
fraud generally, rather than in terms of a specific statutory or regulatory prohibition.
See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
The instant case continues this trend by separating allegations for purposes of liability
while failing to differentiate them in determining damages. The effect of this practice
is that although out-of-pocket damages for rule lOb-6 violations appear to be justified
in theory, there are no cases in which they have been specifically awarded.
98. Section 28(a) states in pertinent part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions,
a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act com-
plained of.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). This section has been construed to prohibit punitive
damages in rule lOb-5 cases. See deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cart.
denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
99. Chris-Craft I, 480 F.2d at 375.
100. Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962).
101. See note 98 supra.
102. See id.
103. E.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
879 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825-26 (E.D. Wis. 1962), ajJ'd,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
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derived from the common law right of the complaining party to be
made whole,104 a right implemented in common law deceit cases105
through use of the out-of-pocket measure of damages. Thus, the out-
of-pocket approach historically has sought to compensate complaining
parties only to the extent that actual damages can be shown.
It can be argued that there is a "complete divorce between what
CCI was denied and the Court of Appeals' measure of damages,"'u 6
that is, that BPC (the "winner") and CCI (the "loser") suffered
identical harm in the decline in market value of the Piper holdings
following the completion of the tender offer:0 7
In a control contest where "the act complained of" is denial of the
opportunity for control, § 28(a) requires that plaintiff's damages be
measured by the value of control and the lost opportunity to com-
pete for it. The loss attendant on a decline in the market value of
the acquired stock clearly does not constitute damages on account of
the act complained of, since it falls on winner and loser alike. 08
Clearly, some part of the damages awarded to Chris-Craft by the Sec-
ond Circuit was not attributable to the violations committed by BPC.
Case authority allows a plaintiff to recover profits accruing to the
defendant as a proximate consequence of the defendant's fraud, 09
but such is not the case here. The decrease in market value of the
Piper stock following the close of the tender offers cannot reasonably
be characterized as profit accruing to defendant BPC that should be
104. See, e.g., Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971).
105. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 10, at 1623-31.
106. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 28, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta
Corp., cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1976).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. E.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965):
On the other hand, if the property is not bought from, but sold to the fraudu-
lent party, future accretions not forseeable at the time of the transfer even on
the true facts, and hence speculative, are subject to another factor, viz., that
they accrued to the fraudulent party. It may, as in the case at bar, be en-
tirely speculative whether, had plaintiffs not sold, the series of fortunate oc-
currences would have happened in the same way, and to their same profit....
However, there can be no speculation but that the defendant actually made
the profit and, once it is found that he acquired the property by fraud, that
the profit was the proximate consequence of the fraud, whether foreseeable or
not. It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of
windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep them.
Id. at 786. See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 118 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1961).
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restored to plaintiff CCI. Just as the Second Circuit in Janigan v.
Taylor10 characterized a recovery of profits resulting from a market
upturn as speculative, so too the court in Chris-Craft III should have
held speculative those damages partially based on a market downturn.
There appears to be no case which has allowed recovery of a loss
suffered by both plaintiff and defendant.
Furthermore, while the purpose of the securities laws to prevent
violators from benefiting by their ill-doings may be served by allowing
plaintiffs to recover windfall profits,"' this purpose cannot be achieved
by requiring violators to pay full damages for loss, some part of which
is certain to be incurred by both competing offerors in a tender offer
regardless of any fraudulent conduct during the tender offer period. In
fact, section 11 (e) of the '33 Act explicitly contemplates such a contin-
gency in the context of material errors or omissions in a registration
statement by providing that, "if defendant proves that any portion or
all of such damages represents other than the depreciation in value of
such security resulting from such registration, . . . such portion of
or all of such damages shall not be recoverable.""11 2 A corrective factor
of this kind should have been considered in constructing the damage
equation in Chris-Craft. The fairest award would utilize the formula
followed by the court of appeals, 83 but would adjust upward the fair
market value found by the court for CCI's block of stock ($27 per
share) by the amount of the market decline attributable to the termi-
nation of the tender offer contest."14
While this formula does not coincide with the out-of-pocket theory
customarily used in securities fraud cases, it is supported by the ten-
dency of the courts to tailor damages to specific fact situations."3 A
new provision of the securities laws deserves corresponding tailoring
110. 344 F.2d at 786.
111. See note 105 supra.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
113. Since the prices paid for the Piper stock during the pendency of the tender
offer were admittedly inflated because of the competitive nature of the situation, the
end of the competition was certain to result in some drop in the market value of the
stock. Chris-Craft III, 516 F.2d at 185 n.15. Acceptance of this fact does not conflict
with the finding of the court of appeals that the prices paid for the Piper stock by
both BPC and CCI were not irrational but "represented what astute businessmen, com-
peting in a free market, thought potentially controlling blocks of Piper stock were
worth." Id. at 185.
114. See text accompanying notes 106-13 supra.
115. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104-05 (10th
Cir. 1971).
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of the measure of damages available to the new class of defrauded
plaintiffs (in this case, tender offerors), i16
Finally, any award of damages that would consume the greater
portion of a defendant's assets is at cross-purposes with the primary
thrust of the securities laws. 117 In the past, the Second Circuit has
balked at awarding extensive relief that does not coincide with the
injury suffered." 8 Payment of $36 million in damages could severely
handicap, if not destroy, BPC.119 This would hardly comport with the
basic purpose of the securities laws-the protection of the public in-
vestor.120 In effect, it would enrich the shareholders of CCI at an un-
bearable expense to the shareholders of BPC,12i many of whom are
former Piper shareholders. The Piper shareholders who accepted BPC's
tender offer would be doubly disadvantaged-both by the original over-
valuation of BPC shares and by the subsequent decline in the value of
BPC shares after the damage award to CCI.
In sum, while the Second Circuit largely applied the correct gen-
eral theory of damages in calculating CCI's injury according to the
116. Actual value (in the out-of-pocket formula of the difference between pur-
chase price and actual value) has always been troublesome to calculate. It has been
equated variously with "real value," "the prices at which the buyers would have pur-
chased the stock in an unmanipulated market," and "the fair value of what the seller
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct." Note, supra note 36, at
384 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).
117. The award ($25 million, plus $10 million in prejudgment interest) is more
than the market value of BPO's common stock and is approximately equal to the entire
shareholder's equity in Piper. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Apr. 5,
1976). It constitutes over 37 percent of the shareholder's equity and 52 percent of
the working capital of BPC. Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1975, at 21, col. 4; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1975, at 44, col. 3, 4. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968).
118. See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 947-48 (2d Cir. 1969); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104-05
(10th Cir. 1971).
119. BPC has announced that it has arranged financing necessary to pay the dam-
ages. The impact of the huge award also is alleviated somewhat by the $7 million in
insurance owed to BPC. Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1975, at 6, col. 3. See also note 121
infra.
120. See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 944-45 (2d Cir. 1969).
121. The effect of the damage award could be mitigated by an agreement, such
as the one announced between BPC and First Boston Corporation, the lead underwriter
for BPC's exchange offer to the Piper shareholders, to share equally in the payment
of the damages. Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1975, at 6, col. 3. The damage judgment might
trigger a deal between BPC and CCI in which BPC would exchange some portion of
its Piper holdings in satisfaction of the judgment debt. This, however, would have the
same devastating effect on BPC, since BPC would lose a major portion of an expen-
sive investment.
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out-of-pocket approach,122 the theory should be modified in tender offer
situations to account for market loss visited upon both parties after the
termination of the tender offer.123 The award announced by the court
of appeals is in part "speculative,"' 2 4 contrary to the intent of section
28(a), and does not further the aims of the securities laws. The result
could well produce an effect contrary to the sound principles of secu-
rities regulation. 2 5
IV. EQurrABLE RELIEF
In compliance with the earlier mandate of the Second Circuit,128
the district court on remand ordered sterilization for five years of
BPC's illegally acquired shares. Since both BPC and CCI continued
to acquire shares after the court's decision,127 the sterilization, without
more, would have given CCI control over Piper. In light of the refusal
of the court of appeals to find that CCI would have gained control of
Piper absent BPC's fraud,12 the district court implemented a series
of additional restrictions designed to maintain the positions of both
companies as they would have been, but for the fraud, at the close
122. See text accompanying notes 90-105 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 105-14 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra. The case has received extensive
comment since the first district court decision in 1969. Three recent articles deal ex-
tensively with the subject of this note. Note, Securities Regulation-Securities Exchange
Act of 1934--Damages Awarded to Unsuccessful Tender Offeror Under Section 14(e)
for Loss of Opportunity to Control Target Corporation, 89 HhAv. L. Rav. 1239 (1976),
examines the most recent decision from the perspective of economic decisional analysis
and concludes that the damage award should have been reduced by an amount at-
tributable to final blockage. The author would award Chris-Craft $16 per share in
damages, Id. at 1246. Note, Chris-Craft: The Uncertain Evolution of Section 14(e),
76 COLu3i. L. REv. 634 (1976), analyzes the damage award by analogy to the
tort law concept of proximate cause. It concludes that there has not been a sufficient
showing of causation to justify an award of damages attributable to general market
decline. Note, Chris-Craft and the Loss of Opportunity to Control: The Lost Oppor-
tunity, 43 FoaDRAm L. Rav. 820 (1975), analyzes the damage award of the district
courM considering both common law and securities approaches to damages.
126. Chris-Craft II, 480 F.2d at 380.
127. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
SUMMARY OF PIPER HOLDINGS
1969 1974
BPC 832,706 857,921
COI 697,495 708,300
128. See Chris-Craft II, 480 F.2d at 373.
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of the tender offers.'2 9 The court of appeals affirmed these restrictions
without qualification. 130 It properly recognized that equitable relief is
a matter within the discretion of the trial court131 and may be em-
ployed as a means to effectuate its judgment. 32 Furthermore, consid-
ering the difficulties of divestiture, the relief granted was the only
effective means for preventing BPG from enjoying the fruits of its ille-
gal conduct. 33
Finally, the court of appeals approved the award of prejudgment
interest as a matter of discretion for the trial court. The court held
that the decision to grant such interest should be made by "balancing
the equities and weighing the notions of fairness to the parties."' 3 4
129. Chris-Craft 111, 516 F.2d at 193.
130. Id. The original rationale of the court of appeals in mandating sterilization
of the shares was to deny BPC the benefits of its fraud. See Chris-Craft II, 480
F.2d at 380. The court apparently considered divestiture of the shares too com-
plicated a process in relation to the end it sought to achieve. See id. at 379. On
appeal, the Second Circuit considered arguments by BPC that the district court's
ruling would effectively stalemate the directors of Piper and disenfranchise all Piper
shareholders, but concluded that because each company had substantial investments
in Piper that neither could afford to jeopardize unnecessarily, each would cooperate
with the other for the duration of the sterilization. Chris-Craft III, 516 F.2d at 193.
131. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972).
132. See Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA.
L.R av. 1188 (1975).
133. The court here implicitly analogized the section 14(e) violation to a section
14(a) proxy violation, for which it has been consistently held that sterilization of use
of illegally obtained shares is a proper application of the equitable injunctive power
of a court. See generally 2 L. Loss, SEcuRiTiEs REGULATION 956-60 (2d ed. 1961).
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), the Supreme Court recently
held that a court still must find irreparable harm and the unavailability of legal rem-
edies before granting equitable relief.
In several recent cases, equitable remedies have been awarded in addition to or
as a substitute for the more traditional damage award. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Co., 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 49 (1975), the Seventh Circuit
ordered the sterilization of defendant's shares for five years. In reversing, the Supreme
Court did not find that such relief was improper but held that a private person suing
under the securities laws must meet the traditional requirements for equitable relief.
In a shareholder's class action suit brought in California by the Center for Law
in the Public Interest against Phillips Petroleum Company, the district court approved
a settlement that included an increase of the board of directors from 11 to 21, 60
percent of whom must be independent. These outside directors will have the sole au-
thority to recommend new directors. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
In addition, the Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board of Di-
rectors of Gulf Oil Corp., Civil No. 75-324 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1975), directly caused
the resignation of the chairman of the board of Gulf Oil and significant changes in
its ,management. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1976, at 1, col. 2. The report, popularly
known as the McCloy Report (after the committee's chairman), was ordered by Judge
John Sirica as the measure necessary to effectuate his judgment. See also Comment,
Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188 (1975).
134. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 527
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The only restriction imposed on such awards is that they must be
compensatory in nature, not punitive.135 Given its reasoning in Chris-
Craft III that the protracted litigation justified characterizing CCI's
interest award as compensatory,136 the court of appeals properly up-
held the award.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Chris-Craft III correctly
repudiated the damage award of the district court on the grounds that
the lower court did not apply the proper method in calculating the
award, 37 and that it failed to consider the problems of blockage and
unmarketability attendant upon the size of CCI's Piper holdings. 88
However, the court of appeals should have adjusted the award of
out-of-pocket damages by an amount reflecting the inevitable market
decreases in the market value of the Piper stock solely attributable to
the termination of the tender offer. 39 These losses fell equally upon
plaintiff and defendant, and cannot be said to have been caused wholly
by BPC's fraud. 40 In contrast, awards to plaintiffs of windfall profits
accruing to defendants can be said to fall within the rubric of denying
an offender the fruits of his illegality. Furthermore, characterizing
such losses as compensable damages is not consistent with the objec-
tives of the securities laws.' 4 ' This final adjustment would perfect the
Second Circuit's extraordinary effort to reach a just decision and to
produce a well-reasoned precedent for future litigation in this com-
plex area of securities law.
MARY CHRISTINE CARTY
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). See, e.g., Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 975, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 1104 (1973); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 416
F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
135. Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969).
136. 516 F.2d at 191.
137. See text accompanying notes 56-80 supra.
138. See note 80 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 106-14 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 106-08 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 109-12 supra.
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ADDENDUM
After this Note went to press, the Supreme Court decided Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.1' The Court held that, as an unsuccessful
tender offeror, CCI did not have standing to bring a private action for
damages under section 14(e) of the '34 Act,'. and that under rule
lOb-6 it could not recover damages for the loss of the "opportunity to
gain control of Piper."'' 4
Because section 14(e) "makes no provision whatever for a private
cause of action,"'145 the Court examined whether a private damage
remedy could or need be implied in CCI's favor under that section of
the '34 Act. Turning to the legislative history of the Williams Act, 146
the Court held that the sole purpose of the amendments to section 14
was to protect target corporation shareholders. 47 The Court found
no hint in the legislative history, on which [Chris-Craft] so heavily
relies, that Congress contemplated a private cause of action for dam-
ages by one of several contending offerors against a successful bidder
or by a losing contender against the target corporation. 148
The Court concluded, therefore, that implying a damages action in
favor of CCI was neither required by section 14(e) nor necessary in
order to accomplish the purposes of the Williams Act. 49
With respect to CCrs rule lOb-6 claim, the Supreme Court's
holding was somewhat narrower. Perceiving no need in this case to
articulate a "definitive resolution of the law of standing under Rule
lOb-6,"'50 the Court held simply that CCI's claim for relief was not
cognizable under rule lOb-6: ". . . Rule lOb-6 is not directed at or
142. 97 S.Ct. 926 (1977). Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the
Court; Justice Blackmun filed a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment, and
Justices Stevens and Brennan dissented.
143. 97 S.Ct. at 949 n.28.
144. Id. at 951.
145. Id. at 941.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (1970).
147. 97 S.Ct. at 946, 948. The Court expressly declined, however, to decide
whether "shareholders-offerees, the class protected by § 14(e), have an implied cause
of action under § 14(e) .. ." 97 S. Ct. at 949 n.28.
148. 97 S. Ct. at 946.
149. Id. at 946-50. In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the four-step
"relevant factor" test it had set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), for "deter-
mining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one."
97 S. Ct. at 947.
150. 97 S. Ct. at 951.
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concerned with contests for corporate control. This technical rule is
focused narrowly upon a precise goal-maintaining an orderly market
for the distribution of securities free from artificial or manipulative
influences."1' Thus, although CCI was indeed a purchaser of Piper
shares, it had not claimed damages on the ground that the price it paid
for the Piper stock had been affected by BPC's rule 10b-6 violations,
but on the ground that those violations deprived it of the opportunity
to gain control of Piper, "a claim beyond the bounds of the specific
concern of Rule 10b-6."'152
Having disposed of CCI's bases for relief, the Court found no
need to consider the Second Circuit's damages calculation. While the
Piper Court did not, therefore, provide any guidance for determining
the correct measure of damages in cases brought under section 14(e),
it did recognize the force of one argument asserted in this Note:
Although it is correct to say that the $36 million damage award in-
directly benefits those Piper shareholders who became Chris-Craft
shareholders when they accepted Chris-Craft's exchange offer, it is
equally true that the damage award injures those Piper shareholders
who exchanged their shares for Bangor Punta's stock and who, as
Bangor Punta shareholders, would necessarily bear a large part of
the burden of any judgment against Bangor Punta.10
The Court concluded that "shareholder protection, if enhanced at all
by damages awards such as Chris-Craft contends for, can more directly
be achieved with other, less drastic means more closely tailored to the
precise congressional goal underlying the Williams Act."'14 Similarly,
although it advanced several grounds for rejecting the award to CCI
of injunctive relief-most notably, that the injunction was premised
"upon the impermissible award of damages" under section 14(e) and
rule lOb-6' 55-the Supreme Court noted that the injunction was es-
pecially inappropriate because "no regard was given to the interests
151. Id. The Court pointed out that the purpose of rule lOb-6, which prohibits
issuers from purchasing rights to their own shares during a distribution, is "to prevent
stimulative trading by an issuer in its own securities in order to create an unnatural
and unwarranted appearance of market activity." 97 S. Ct. at 950.
152. 97 S. Ct. at 951.
153. Id. at 948. This statement corresponds with one of the arguments developed
in this Note. See notes 117-21 supra & accompanying text.
154. 97 S. Ct. at 949.
155. Id. at 952. The Court declined, however, to decide "whether as a general
proposition a suit in equity for injunctive relief, as distinguished from an action for
damages, would lie in favor of a tender offeror under either § 14(e) or Rule 10b-6."
97 S. Ct. at 952 n.33.
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of the protected class of shareholders-offerees, many of whom would be
at least indirectly disadvantaged by the award."1 56
Although the Supreme Court has severely limited the class of
persons entitled to bring section 14(e) actions by denying standing to
tender offerors, the Court did suggest that shareholders of a target
corporation who do not tender their shares, and who cannot, there-
fore, claim the protection of rule lOb-5,157 might have standing to sue
under section 14(e). 58 Thus, although the Court has foreclosed re-
course to section 14(e) and rule lOb-6 by tender offerors claiming
damages for loss of the opportunity to gain control of target com-
panies, the Court's recognition that section 14(e) may be the source
of a private right of action in favor of other classes of plaintiffs sug-
gests that the damages formulation developed in this Note will be
relevant to future cases.
M. C. C.
156. 97 S. Ct. at 952.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
158. 97 S. Ct. at 948.
1976-77]

